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APPLICATION TO FILE A BRIEF AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF 
RESPONDENT AND STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 
 
 Pursuant to California Rule of Court, Rule 8.520, amici curiae hereby 
respectfully apply for leave to file a brief amici curiae in support of the 
respondent, Kenneth Humphrey. 
 Amici are professors of criminal, procedural, and constitutional law 
at law schools across the United States.1 
 Amici are authors of many scholarly books, articles, and journalistic 
pieces on criminal, procedural, and constitutional law related to the issues 
before this Court. Several amici direct clinics or have otherwise participated 
in criminal litigation at bail hearings and other pretrial stages. 
 Amici have widely varying perspectives on many constitutional issues 
relating to pretrial criminal procedure, but agree that well-accepted federal 
constitutional principles and the overall history and tradition of the United 
States in regard to practices of pretrial bail support the proposition held by 
the lower court, that when the government proposes to incarcerate a person 
before trial, it must provide thorough justification, whether the mechanism 
of detention is a transparent detention order or its functional equivalent, the 
imposition of unaffordable money bail. Amici have a substantial interest in 
the issue before this Court, and believe that their expertise can help the Court 
assess more fully the merits of respondent’s position. 
 Amici recognize that the parties in this case rely on both California’s 
Constitution and state laws as well as federal constitutional law. While not 
ignoring the former, as practitioners and professors of law from across the 
United States, amici focus their remarks on federal constitutional law and on 
                                                 
1 The views expressed herein are the personal views of amici. Amici 
and counsel for amici have listed their titles and affiliations for purposes of 
identification only.  
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the history and tradition of bail common to the vast majority of the American 
states. 
 No party or counsel for any party in the pending appeal authored the 
proposed amicus brief in whole or in part, and no one other than amici, and 
their counsel of record, made any monetary contribution intended to fund the 
preparation or submission of the brief. 
 




Kellen R. Funk 
Sandra G. Mayson 
Counsel for Amici 
National Law Professors of Criminal, 






SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
 
As scholars and professors of criminal law, criminal procedure, and 
federal constitutional law, we urge this Court to affirm the core federal 
constitutional holding of the decision below:  When the government proposes 
to incarcerate a person before trial, it must provide thorough justification, 
whether the mechanism of detention is a transparent detention order or its 
functional equivalent, the imposition of unaffordable money bail.  
This simple principle follows from the respect for physical liberty the 
Constitution enshrines. The protections of the criminal process—including 
the presumption of innocence, the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt, and the institution of bail itself—are meant to deny the state the power 
to imprison individuals solely on the basis of a criminal charge. “In our 
society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the 
carefully limited exception.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 
(1987). This is an empty promise if a court can unilaterally detain a person 
by casually imposing a monetary bail amount that she cannot pay.  
More specifically, as the Court of Appeal explained, the principle that 
any order of detention requires robust safeguards follows from two related 
lines of federal constitutional jurisprudence. The first is the line of Supreme 
Court cases, culminating in Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983), 
holding that the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment prohibit the state from conditioning a defendant’s liberty on a 
monetary payment she cannot make unless no less restrictive alternative can 
meet its interests. The second is the line of cases, including United States v. 
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, recognizing that physical liberty is a fundamental 
right, the deprivation of which triggers heightened scrutiny and requires 
procedural protections. The imposition of unaffordable bail constitutes a de 
13 
 
facto order of detention that deprives defendants of liberty—a proposition 
that no party to this case disputes. 
Each of these doctrinal lines establishes that pretrial detention—either 
ordered outright or via unaffordable money bail—must be attended by a 
substantive legal determination and robust procedural safeguards. A court 
contemplating money bail must determine whether it is likely to result in 
detention. If so, and the court nonetheless wishes to impose it, the court must 
find, by clear and convincing evidence established through an adversary 
hearing, that the unaffordable bail amount serves a compelling interest of the 
state that no less restrictive condition of release can meet. This will rarely be 
the case. Few defendants pose an acute risk of willful flight or of committing 
serious harm in the pretrial phase. For the vast majority, attainable conditions 
of release can adequately protect the state’s interests in ensuring appearance 
and protecting public safety, while also preserving the fundamental right to 
pretrial liberty. 
The principle that the government must thoroughly justify any order 
of pretrial detention is not radical. Rather, it is continuous with the historical 
commitments of the bail system. Clarification of this core constitutional 
mandate is essential to recovering a rational system of pretrial detention and 
release, and the freedom it protects. 
This brief does not address the question of whether unaffordable bail 
violates the Eighth Amendment Excessive Bail Clause.2 Presuming for 
present purposes that the Eighth Amendment does not itself forbid 
                                                 
2 That question is not before the Court. Case law on that question, 
moreover, is mixed. See Colin Starger & Michael Bullock, Legitimacy, 
Authority, and the Right to Affordable Bail, 26 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. 
J. 589, 605-610 (2018) (tracking and evaluating relevant case law).  
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unaffordable bail, we enumerate the constitutional criteria for a bail order 
that functions as an order of detention.  
 
I. THE BEARDEN LINE: EQUAL PROTECTION AND DUE PROCESS FORBID 
DETENTION ON MONEY BAIL UNLESS NO ALTERNATIVE SATISFIES 
THE STATE’S INTERESTS 
 
The Supreme Court has long been attuned to the danger that, without 
vigilance, core civil liberties might become a function of resources rather 
than of personhood. In a line of cases beginning with Griffin v. Illinois, 351 
U.S. 12 (1956), and culminating in Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983), 
the Court has established that the state cannot condition a person’s liberty on 
a monetary payment she cannot afford unless no alternative method can meet 
the state’s needs. As the Ninth Circuit recently put it: “[N]o person may be 
imprisoned merely on account of his poverty.” Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 
F.3d 976, 981 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 
A. Bearden and Predecessor Cases Establish that the Government 
May Not Condition Liberty on Payment Unless No Alternative 
Meets Its Interests. 
 
This line of jurisprudence began with challenges to wealth-based 
deprivations of another civil right: access to the courts. In Griffin v. Illinois, 
351 U.S. 12 (1956), convicted prisoners lacked the funds to procure 
necessary transcripts for a direct appeal. The Supreme Court held that the 
Fourteenth Amendment prohibited Illinois from conditioning access to a 
direct appeal on wealth. As Justice Black wrote: “Both equal protection and 
due process emphasize the central aim of our entire judicial system—all 
people charged with crime must, so far as the law is concerned, ‘stand on an 
equality before the bar of justice in every American court.’” Id. at 17 (quoting 
Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 241 (1940)); see also id. at 24 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring in the judgment) (“If [Illinois] has a general 
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policy of allowing criminal appeals, it cannot make lack of means an 
effective bar to the exercise of this opportunity.”).  
The Court reaffirmed Griffin’s holding in Douglas v. California, 372 
U.S. 353 (1963), a challenge to California’s system for appointing counsel 
in direct appeals. In cases where an indigent defendant requested appellate 
counsel, California law directed a state appellate court to conduct “an 
independent investigation of the record” and appoint counsel only if it judged 
that counsel would be “helpful” to the presentation of the case. Id. at 355 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Douglas Court noted 
that the appellate court was thus “forced to prejudge the merits [of an indigent 
defendant’s appeal] before it can even determine whether counsel should be 
provided,” whereas people who could afford counsel were not “forced to run 
this gantlet of a preliminary showing of merit.” Id. at 356–57. The Court held 
that a such a system violates the Fourteenth Amendment: “[W]here the merits 
of the one and only appeal an indigent has as of right are decided without 
benefit of counsel, we think an unconstitutional line has been drawn between 
rich and poor.” Id. at 357 (emphasis removed).  
Soon thereafter, the Supreme Court applied the logic of Griffin and 
Douglas to wealth-based deprivations of physical liberty. The petitioner in 
Williams v. Illinois was held in prison after the expiration of his one-year 
term pursuant to an Illinois law that permitted continued confinement in lieu 
of paying off a fine. 399 U.S. 235, 236–37 (1970). Although the law offered 
“an apparently equal opportunity for limiting confinement to the statutory 
maximum simply by satisfying a money judgment,” the Supreme Court held 
that this was “an illusory choice for Williams or any indigent who, by 
definition, is without funds.” Id. at 242. The Court concluded that the 
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the state from “making the maximum 
confinement contingent on one’s ability to pay.” Id.. The following year, in 
Tate v. Short, the Court held that “the Constitution prohibits the State from 
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imposing a fine as a sentence and then automatically converting it into a jail 
term solely because the defendant is indigent and cannot forthwith pay the 
fine in full.” 401 U.S. 395, 398 (1971) (quoting and adopting the reasoning 
of Morris v. Schoonfield, 399 U.S. 508 (1970)).   
Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983), synthesized this line of 
cases. The petitioner in Bearden challenged the revocation of his probation 
for failure to pay a fine. Id. at 662–63. To frame the Court’s reasoning, Justice 
O’Connor explained that “[d]ue process and equal protection principles 
converge in the Court’s analysis” of cases where the state treats criminal 
defendants differently on the basis of wealth: “[W]e generally analyze the 
fairness of relations between the criminal defendant and the State under the 
Due Process Clause, while we approach the question whether the State has 
invidiously denied one class of defendants a substantial benefit available to 
another class of defendants under the Equal Protection Clause.” Id. at 665. 
The parties had argued over which tier of scrutiny should apply, but the Court 
rejected “resort to easy slogans or pigeonhole analysis,” instead requiring “a 
careful inquiry into such factors as ‘the nature of the individual interest 
affected, the extent to which it is affected, the rationality of the connection 
between legislative means and purpose, [and] the existence of alternative 
means for effectuating the purpose.’” Id. at 666–67 (quoting Williams, 399 
U.S. at 260 (Harlan, J., concurring)).  
Considering the relevant factors, the Bearden Court concluded that 
the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits revocation of probation solely on the 
basis of nonpayment, when alternate measures may suffice to meet the state’s 
interests. Id. at 672–73. “Only if alternate measures are not adequate to meet 
the State’s interests . . . may the court imprison a probationer who has made 
sufficient bona fide efforts to pay.” Id. at 672. To hold otherwise, the Court 
reasoned, “would deprive the probationer of his conditional freedom 
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simply because, through no fault of his own, he cannot pay the fine.” Id. at 
672–73.  
 
B. The Bearden Doctrine Prohibits Unnecessary Detention on 
Money Bail. 
  
The Bearden rule—that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits 
unnecessary deprivations of liberty on the basis of indigence alone—applies 
“with special force in the bail context, where fundamental deprivations are 
at issue and arrestees are presumed innocent.” Buffin v. City & Cty. of San 
Francisco, Civil No. 15-4959, 2018 WL 424362, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 
2018); accord, e.g.,  Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053, 1056–57 (5th Cir. 
1978) (en banc) (“[Pretrial] imprisonment solely because of indigent status 
is invidious discrimination and not constitutionally permissible”); ODonnell 
v. Harris Cty., 892 F.3d 147, 157 (5th Cir. 2018); Walker v. City of Calhoun, 
901 F.3d 1245, 1259–60 (11th Cir. 2018).3 In the pretrial domain, Bearden 
and its predecessors prohibit the state from conditioning a person’s liberty 
on a payment she cannot make—unaffordable money bail or other secured 
financial condition of release—unless no “alternative measure” can 
adequately meet the state’s interests. 461 U.S. at 672–73. The state’s interest 
in the pretrial context is in ensuring defendants’ appearance at future court 
dates and in protecting public safety. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951); 
Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750. Bearden thus prohibits a court from conditioning a 
defendant’s pretrial liberty on payment of an unaffordable amount unless no 
alternative measure can adequately promote those goals. An increasing 
                                                 
3 The Fifth Circuit recently stayed a revised preliminary injunction 
issued in ODonnell pending appeal, but did not question the applicability of 





number of federal courts have recognized this straightforward application of 
the Bearden doctrine. See, e.g., ODonnell, 892 F.3d at 162 (concluding that 
“although the County had a compelling interest in the assurance of a 
misdemeanor detainee’s future appearance and lawful behavior, its policy [of 
detaining misdemeanor defendants who could not afford prescheduled bond 
amounts] was not narrowly tailored to meet that interest”).4 
 
                                                 
4 See also Rainwater, 572 F.2d at 1057; Caliste v. Cantrell, Civil No. 
17-6197, 2018 WL 3727768, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, *9 (E.D. La. Aug. 6, 2018); 
Shultz v. State, Civil No. 17-270, 2018 WL 4219541, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, *11–
12 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 4, 2018); Buffin v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, Civil 
No. 15-4959, 2018 WL 424362, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2018); Thompson 
v. Moss Point, Civil No. 15-182, 2015 WL 10322003, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Nov. 
6, 2015); Jones v. City of Clanton, Civil No. 215-34, 2015 WL 5387219, at 
*2 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 14, 2015) ; Pierce v. Velda City, Civil No. 15-570, 2015 
WL 10013006, at *1 (E.D. Mo. June 3, 2015); Cooper v. City of Dothan, 
Civil No. 15-425, 2015 WL 10013003, at *1 (M.D. Ala. June 18, 2015); 
accord Statement of Interest of the United States Department of Justice at 
1, Varden v. City of Clanton, Civil No. 15-34, ECF Doc. 26 (M.D. Ala., 
February 13, 2015) (“Incarcerating individuals solely because of their 
inability to pay for their release, whether through the payment of fines, fees, 
or a cash bond, violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”); OFFICE FOR ACCESS TO JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, 




C. The Bearden Doctrine Subjects Wealth-Based Detention to 
Heightened Scrutiny 
 
In recent litigation, a number of federal courts have struggled to 
determine which level of scrutiny applies to Bearden claims challenging 
aspects of money-bail systems. They have reached different conclusions. 
Compare, e.g., ODonnell v. Harris Cty., 251 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1138–39 
(S.D. Tex. 2017) (concluding that “intermediate” scrutiny applies to 
differential detention based on wealth), aff’d as modified, 892 F.3d at 161, 
with Walker, 2018 WL 4000252, at *8–10 (concluding that rational-basis-
review applies to the first 48 hours of pretrial detention prior to a bail 
hearing); ODonnell v. Goodhart, 900 F.3d at 226–28 (same).5  
This dispute arguably misapprehends the Bearden line. Bearden itself 
rejected the tiered-scrutiny framework. The Supreme Court held, instead, 
that the proper framework for analyzing a claim of wealth-based 
discrimination in the criminal justice system was a multi-factored analysis 
similar to traditional due process analysis but also informed by equal 
protection principles, what some scholars call an “intersectional” analysis. 
Kerry Abrams & Brandon L. Garrett, Cumulative Constitutional Rights, 97 
B.U. L. REV. 1309, 1315 (2017) (defining an “intersectional rights case” as 
“one involving rights that, when read together, magnify each other”); see also 
Michael Coenen, Combining Constitutional Clauses, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 
1067 (2016). Bearden recognized that wealth-based deprivations of liberty 
implicate both substantive and procedural rights. 
                                                 
5 It is worth noting here that a number of courts have found systems 
that permit the casual or automatic imposition of unaffordable bail to fail 
even rational basis review. See, e.g., Shultz, 2018 WL 4219541, at 15 n.23; 




 In practical effect, though, the Bearden doctrine essentially calls for 
heightened scrutiny when the individual interest at stake is physical liberty. 
This is clear from Bearden’s final rule: “Only if alternative measures are not 
adequate to meet the State’s interests” may a court imprison a defendant for 
inability to satisfy a financial obligation. 461 U.S. at 672. The rule itself 
states a narrow tailoring requirement. Detention for nonpayment must be the 
only means of achieving the state’s interests; if alternative means are 
available, detention is impermissible. Accord Buffin, 2018 WL 424362, at 
*9. 
It is logical that wealth-based detention should trigger heightened 
scrutiny, given that all detention infringes the fundamental right to liberty. 
See infra Section II.A; see also Shultz, 2018 WL 4219541, *15 n.23. Indeed, 
the ostensible disagreement among the courts as to what degree of scrutiny 
applies is better understood as a disagreement over whether there has been a 
deprivation of liberty at all. In Walker, for instance, the Eleventh Circuit 
panel majority found that the challenged bail procedures did not deprive 
indigent defendants of pretrial liberty, but only subjected them to an 
incrementally slower release process than those who could afford to post 
bond. 901 F.3d, at 1261–62; see also Edwards v. Cofield, Civil No. 17-321, 
2018 WL 4101511, at *2 (M.D. Ala. Aug. 28, 2018) (“[A]s the Eleventh 
Circuit explained in Walker, indigent arrestees (such as Plaintiff) do not 
suffer an ‘absolute deprivation’ of pretrial release.”).6 The dissenting judge 
                                                 
6 A Fifth Circuit motions panel opinion in ODonnell seems to have 
reached a similar conclusion. ODonnell v. Goodhart, 900 F.3d at 226–28 
(holding that, although “heightened scrutiny applied to the bail schedule” 
originally challenged, a 48-hour detention for indigent defendants awaiting 
a bail hearing triggered only rational-basis review).  
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in Walker, by contrast, concluded that “an incarcerated person suffers a 
complete deprivation of liberty . . . , whether their jail time lasts two days or 
two years.” 901 F.3d at 1274 (Martin, J., dissenting in part).7 The core dispute 
in these cases is whether a two- or three-day detention is a deprivation of 
liberty sufficient to trigger the Bearden rule at all. No court, however, has 
contested the application of the rule itself to the pretrial domain: The 
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits unnecessary detention on the basis of 
money bail.   
  
II. THE SALERNO LINE: DUE PROCESS REQUIRES THAT ANY ORDER OF 
DETENTION MEET ROBUST SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL 
CRITERIA 
 
The second line of Supreme Court jurisprudence that constrains 
pretrial detention—whether ordered outright or via unaffordable money 
bail—is the series of cases in which the Court has considered the due process 
criteria for non-punitive detention. Because the right to physical liberty is 
                                                 
7 The notion of an “absolute deprivation” of liberty comes from San 
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), where 
the Supreme Court recognized that Williams-Tate was an exception to the 
rule that wealth-based discrimination merits only rational basis review. The 
Court justified the rule and the exception on the reasoning that an “absolute 
deprivation” of liberty, such as custodial detention, was significantly more 
serious than a deprivation of degree, such as school systems that deprived 
poor students of the same quality of education as wealthy ones. Id. at 20–21. 
We agree with the Eleventh Circuit dissenter that even a detention lasting a 
few days is, for that period, an absolute deprivation of bodily liberty 
triggering the exception to Rodriguez and requiring heightened scrutiny.  
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fundamental, regulatory detention of an adult citizen triggers strict scrutiny, 
and must comply with robust substantive and procedural limits to survive.  
 
A. Substantive Due Process Requires That Detention Be Carefully 
Tailored to a Compelling Government Interest. 
 
The Supreme Court has recognized that the right to pretrial liberty is 
“fundamental.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987); see also 
United States v. Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U.S. 711, 716 (1990). Physical 
liberty is not only a fundamental right, it secures numerous other 
fundamental rights. In the pretrial context, the “traditional right to freedom 
before conviction permits the unhampered preparation of a defense, and 
serves to prevent the infliction of punishment prior to conviction. Unless this 
right to bail before trial is preserved, the presumption of innocence, secured 
only after centuries of struggle, would lose its meaning.” Stack v. Boyle, 342 
U.S. 1, 4 (1951) (internal citation omitted). 
As the Supreme Court has long acknowledged, the consequences of 
depriving a defendant of pretrial liberty are profound. “The time spent in jail 
awaiting trial has a detrimental impact on the individual. It often means loss 
of a job; it disrupts family life; and it enforces idleness.” Barker v. Wingo, 
407 U.S. 514, 532–33 (1972). A defendant behind bars “is hindered in his 
ability to gather evidence, contact witnesses, or otherwise prepare his 
defense.” Id. at 533. Recent empirical research has confirmed that pretrial 
detention itself increases the likelihood of conviction and the likely sentence 
imposed. E.g., Paul Heaton, Sandra Mayson & Megan Stevenson, The 
Downstream Consequences of Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 STAN. L. 
REV. 711, 741–59, 787 (2017); Will Dobbie, Jacob Goldin & Crystal S. 
Yang, The Effects of Pre-Trial Detention on Conviction, Future Crime, and 
Employment: Evidence from Randomly Assigned Judges, 108 AM. ECON. 
REV. 201, 224–26, 234 (2018). Some evidence suggests that it increases the 
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likelihood that the person detained will commit future crime. E.g. Heaton et 
al., supra, at 759–69; CHRISTOPHER T. LOWENKAMP ET AL., LAURA & JOHN 
ARNOLD FOUND., THE HIDDEN COSTS OF PRETRIAL DETENTION (2013). 
Detention also has adverse downstream effects on defendants’ employment 
prospects. Dobbie et al., supra, at 227–32, 235. Importantly, the research 
indicates that all of these adverse effects are triggered by as little as two or 
three days of detention. Id. at 212; LOWENKAMP ET AL, supra. The cascading 
effects of detention extend beyond the individual; they affect entire 
communities. See Jocelyn Simonson, Bail Nullification, 115 MICH. L. REV. 
585, 612–16, 629–30 (2017); SHIMA BARADARAN BAUGHMAN, THE BAIL 
BOOK: A COMPREHENSIVE LOOK AT BAIL IN AMERICA’S CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM 77–91 (2018). Pretrial release is therefore a public, and not just an 
individual, interest. Id. 
Because the right to pretrial liberty is fundamental, the substantive 
component of due process forbids pretrial detention unless the detention at 
issue is narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest. See, e.g., Reno v. 
Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993) (infringements of fundamental rights must 
be “narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest” (citing, inter alia, 
Salerno, 481 U.S. at 746)). The Supreme Court has not explicitly announced 
that pretrial detention is subject to strict scrutiny under substantive due 
process. But Salerno articulated the tailoring requirement of strict scrutiny in 
only slightly different terms. Having acknowledged the “fundamental 
nature” of the right to pretrial liberty, the Salerno Court upheld the 
challenged detention scheme on the basis that it was “a carefully limited 
exception” to the “norm” of pretrial liberty. 481 U.S. at 755, 746–52. It 
“narrowly focuse[d] on a particularly acute problem in which the 
Government interests are overwhelming” by limiting detention eligibility 
and requiring courts to comply with strict substantive and procedural 
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requirements before detention could be imposed. Id. at 749–52; see also infra 
Section III.A. 
“If there was any doubt about the level of scrutiny applied in Salerno, 
it has been resolved in subsequent Supreme Court decisions, which have 
confirmed that Salerno involved a fundamental liberty interest and applied 
heightened scrutiny.” Lopez-Valenzuela v. Arpaio, 770 F.3d 772, 780–81 
(9th Cir. 2014) (en banc). In Foucha v. Louisiana, for instance, the Court 
held that the detention of defendants acquitted on insanity grounds violated 
substantive due process on the basis that, “unlike the sharply focused scheme 
at issue in Salerno, the Louisiana scheme of confinement is not carefully 
limited.” 504 U.S. 71, 81 (1992); see also Flores, 507 U.S. at 316 (O’Connor, 
J., concurring) (“The institutionalization of an adult by the government 
triggers heightened, substantive due process scrutiny.”). Substantive due 
process thus requires that pretrial detention be narrowly tailored to a 
compelling state interest, which may include the state’s interests in 
promoting public safety and the effective administration of justice. 
 
B. An Order of Detention Must Comply with Robust Procedural 
Safeguards. 
 
The Due Process Clause also prohibits the deprivation of liberty or 
property without procedural safeguards. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 
332 (1976). In order to identify the specific procedural requirements for any 
given deprivation, courts consider “three distinct factors:” (1) “the private 
interest that will be affected by the official action;” (2) “the risk of an 
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the 
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;” and 
(3) “the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal 
and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural 
requirement would entail.” Id. at 335. Where the “private interest” at stake is 
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physical liberty, the risk of erroneous deprivations is particularly acute and 
procedural safeguards are especially critical. See, e.g., Turner v. Rogers, 564 
U.S. 431, 445 (2011); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 73 (1967). Part III will 
consider at greater length what specific procedures are constitutionally 
required for pretrial detention.  
 
C. An Order Imposing Unattainable Bail is an Order of Detention. 
 
As a matter of both logic and law, an order imposing a secured 
condition of release that a defendant cannot satisfy constitutes an order of 
detention. It has precisely the same result: the defendant remains in jail. As 
the court below put it, “requiring money bail as a condition of pretrial release 
at an amount it is impossible for the defendant to pay is the functional 
equivalent of a pretrial detention order.” In re Humphrey, 228 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 
513, 517 (Ct. App. 2018). No party to this litigation disputes that fact. Accord 
ODonnell, 892 F.3d at 158 (“[W]hen the accused is indigent, setting a 
secured bail will, in most cases, have the same effect as a detention order.”); 
Shultz, 2018 WL 4219541, at *9 (unattainable bail assessments “serve as de 
facto detention orders for the indigent”); United States v. Leathers, 412 F.2d 
169, 171 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (“The authors of the [federal Bail Reform] Act 
were fully aware that the setting of bond unreachable because of its amount 
would be tantamount to setting no conditions at all.”). Because an order 
imposing unattainable bail is in fact a detention order, the due process 
requirements for a detention order apply. Accord, e.g., Brangan v. 
Commonwealth, 80 N.E.3d 949, 963 (Mass. 2017) (explaining that 
unaffordable bail “is the functional equivalent of an order for pretrial 
detention,” so “must be evaluated in light of the same due process 
requirements applicable to such a deprivation of liberty”).  
In an analogous statutory context, the federal Bail Reform Act 
recognizes that the setting of unaffordable bail triggers all of the procedures 
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and protections that must attend a direct order of detention. The Senate 
Report on the law explains that, if a court concludes that an unaffordable 
money bond is necessary,  
then it would appear that there is no available condition of 
release that will assure the defendant’s appearance. This is the 
very finding which, under section 3142(e), is the basis for an 
order of detention, and therefore the judge may proceed with a 
detention hearing pursuant to section 3142(f) and order the 
defendant detained, if appropriate. 
S. REP. No. 98-225, at 16 (1984) (emphasis added).  
The Fifth Circuit, in declining to hold that the Bail Reform Act 
prohibits unaffordable bail entirely, went out of its way to emphasize that 
unaffordable bail does trigger full detention proceedings. United States v. 
McConnell, 842 F.2d 105, 108–10 (5th Cir. 1988); see also United States v. 
Mantecon-Zayas, 949 F.2d 548, 550 (1st Cir. 1991) (“[O]nce a court finds 
itself in this situation—insisting on terms in a ‘release’ order that will cause 
the defendant to be detained pending trial—it must satisfy the procedural 
requirements for a valid detention order.”); United States v. Clark, Crim. No. 
12-156, 2012 WL 5874483, at *3 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 20, 2012) (“In short, a 
finding that a defendant is unable to meet the financial conditions of a release 
order serves as a trigger to proceed to make the findings necessary to detain 
a defendant pursuant to a detention hearing.”). 
 The notion that a court could circumvent the constitutional 
requirements for detention merely by announcing an unaffordable bail 
amount is logically and legally untenable. As Congress recognized in the Bail 
Reform Act and as the Fifth Circuit recognized in McConnell, an order 
imposing unaffordable bail is a detention order. The Court of Appeals was 
thus correct to conclude that “the [trial] court’s order, by setting bail in an 
amount it was impossible for petitioner to pay” without a determination of 
necessity and robust procedural safeguards, “effectively constituted a sub 
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rosa detention order lacking the due process protections constitutionally 
required to attend such an order.” In re Humphrey, 228 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 517. 
 
III. EQUAL PROTECTION AND DUE PROCESS PROHIBIT UNAFFORDABLE 
BAIL ABSENT A DETERMINATION OF NECESSITY AND ROBUST 
PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS 
 
As Parts I and II explained, two distinct lines of federal constitutional 
jurisprudence constrain the imposition of unaffordable bail.8 Bearden and 
predecessor cases prohibit unnecessary detention on money bail; they require 
a substantive determination that no less restrictive measure can meet the 
state’s interests. Due process doctrine, as elaborated in Salerno and cases that 
followed, requires that regulatory detention be narrowly tailored to a 
compelling state interest and imposed pursuant to a process that protects the 
liberty interest at stake. Both lines of doctrine thus require a substantive 
determination of necessity before the state may detain a person for inability 
to post bond. Due process additionally requires that this determination be 
attended by robust procedural protections. 
 
A. Equal Protection and Due Process Prohibit the Setting of 
Unaffordable Bail Absent a Determination of Necessity. 
 
Both the Bearden and the Salerno lines of jurisprudence require a 
determination of necessity before the government can detain an individual 
for inability to post bail. In order to fulfill this requirement, a court must first 
consider a defendant’s ability to pay. Cf. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 672; 
Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 992–93 (9th Cir. 2017) (Bearden and 
its predecessors “stand for the general proposition that when a person’s 
freedom from governmental detention is conditioned on payment of a 
                                                 
8 The Eighth and Fourth Amendments are also relevant, but not at 
issue here. See infra Section IV.B.  
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monetary sum, courts must consider the person’s financial situation . . .”) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). If the bail amount contemplated is 
beyond the defendant’s ability to procure, such that the bail order will 
constitute an order of detention, the unaffordable bail amount violates due 
process and equal protection unless the court determines that it is the least 
restrictive means to meet a compelling state interest. Accord Rainwater, 572 
F.2d at 1057 (explaining that any “requirement in excess” of the amount 
“necessary to provide reasonable assurance of the accused’s presence at trial 
. . . would be inherently punitive and run afoul of due process requirements”). 
The same is true of any bail system that permits the imposition of 
unaffordable bail. Accord ODonnell, 892 F.3d at 162; Brangan, 80 N.E.3d at 
959; Lee v. Lawson, 375 So. 2d 1019, 1023 (Miss. 1979) (“A consideration 
of the equal protection and due process rights of indigent pretrial detainees 
leads us to the inescapable conclusion that a bail system based on monetary 
bail alone would be unconstitutional.”). 
The state’s interests during the pretrial phase are in ensuring the 
integrity of the judicial process—which includes ensuring a defendant’s 
appearance at trial and the safety of witnesses—and in protecting public 
safety. See, e.g., Salerno, 481 U.S. at 752–53. Yet these amorphous phrases 
can be misleading, because the state cannot claim an interest in guaranteeing 
defendants’ appearance or in eliminating law-breaking. Every person poses 
some risk of nonappearance and of committing future crime. Short of jailing 
every accused person in escape- and crime-proof conditions, the state cannot 
eliminate all risk of nonappearance and future law-breaking. Any effort to do 
so would contravene the basic values of a legal order that prizes individual 
liberty and the presumption of innocence. Id.at 755 (emphasizing that pretrial 
liberty must be the “norm” and detention a “carefully limited exception”); 
see also Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895) (noting that the 
presumption of innocence is “the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, 
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and its enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our 
criminal law”). See generally Shima Baradaran, Restoring the Presumption 
of Innocence, 72 Ohio St. L.J. 723 (2011). As the Supreme Court has written 
with respect to flight risk: “Admission to bail always involves a risk that the 
accused will take flight. That is a calculated risk which the law takes as the 
price of our system of justice.” Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 8 (1951).  
The more precise formulation, then, is that the state has a compelling 
interest in eliminating significant threats to witnesses, public safety, or the 
integrity of the judicial process. The drafters of the federal Bail Reform Act 
recognized this nuance. See S. REP. 98-225, at 7 (1984) (noting that “the 
societal interest implicated” by preventive detention was “the need to protect 
the integrity of the judicial process” from defendants who have “threatened 
jurors or witnesses, or who pose significant risks to flight,” and “[t]he need 
to protect the community from demonstrably dangerous defendants” 
(footnote omitted)). The Salerno Court did too: It upheld the Act in part 
because, by limiting eligibility for detention to defendants who posed the 
greatest risk, it addressed a “particularly acute problem.” 481 U.S. at 750.  
It will rarely be the case that detention—including detention via 
unaffordable bail—is the least restrictive means of eliminating significant 
flight and public safety risks. Few defendants pose such risk in the first place. 
For those that do, alternative conditions of release may be sufficient to 
manage it.  As a number of courts have now noted, the evidence on the 
relative efficacy of secured money bond at ensuring appearance or 
preventing crime is mixed at best. ODonnell, 892 F.3d, at 162 (noting that 
the district court’s “thorough review of empirical data and studies found that 
the County had failed to establish any ‘link between financial conditions of 
release and appearance at trial or law-abiding behavior before trial’” 
(referring to ODonnell, 251 F. Supp. 3d at 1117–21, quoting id. at 1152); 
Shultz, 2018 WL 4219541, at *13–14, 24 (reviewing empirical evidence and 
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concluding that there is no indication that secured bail is superior to other 
conditions of release at ensuring appearance or preventing new arrests).  
Detention is especially unlikely to be necessary to ensure appearance. 
Most nonappearance is not willful flight from justice; many people fail to 
appear because they do not receive adequate notice of court dates, because 
they cannot afford to miss work, because they lack childcare or 
transportation, and for a range of other psychological and logistical reasons. 
See, e.g., Lauryn P. Gouldin, Defining Flight Risk, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 677, 
729–35 (2018) (classifying this genre of nonappearance as “low-cost 
nonappearance,” versus “true flight [from the jurisdiction of arrest]” and 
“local absconding”). As Professor Gouldin has explained, there are ample 
risk management measures short of detention that can effectively redress 
these obstacles to appearance. Id. Court-reminder systems and transportation 
support appear particularly promising. Id. at 731–32 (citing studies that show 
“that reminding defendants or their families of court dates can significantly 
reduce FTAs [failures to appear]”); BRICE COOKE ET AL., UNIV. OF CHI. 
CRIME LAB, USING BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE TO IMPROVE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
OUTCOMES: PREVENTING FAILURES TO APPEAR IN COURT (2018)9 (rigorous 
controlled study finding that redesign of court-date notice form and text-
message reminders decreased nonappearance by 36%); Jason Tashea, Text-
Message Reminders Are a Cheap and Effective Way to Reduce Pretrial 
Detention, ABA JOURNAL (July 17, 2018). When there is a real risk of willful 
flight, electronic monitoring should usually be effective to mitigate it. See 
Samuel R. Wiseman, Pretrial Detention and the Right to Be Monitored, 123 
                                                 





YALE L.J. 1344 (2014). It should be the rare case indeed where detention is 
necessary to get a person to court. 
It will also be rare that detention is the least restrictive alternative 
capable of meeting the state’s interest in protecting public safety. It is 
important to note that “the government’s interest in preventing crime by 
anyone is legitimate and compelling,” United States v. Scott, 450 F.3d 863, 
870 (9th Cir. 2006), but that interest rarely justifies ex ante detention. The 
state must generally restrict its preventive efforts to threatening ex post 
punishment for bad acts, rather than preemptively lock up anyone who might 
commit some future harm. E.g. H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND 
RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 23, 44 (2d ed. 2008); 
Salerno, 481 U.S. at 749; Sandra G. Mayson, Dangerous Defendants, 127 
YALE L.J. 490 (2018) (arguing that the degree of risk that justifies detention 
is no different for defendants than non-defendants). 
Salerno suggests some of the limits that careful tailoring may require 
of a detention order or detention regime. In upholding the preventive 
detention provisions of the federal Bail Reform Act, the Salerno Court noted 
that the regime applied only to those charged with “a specific category of 
extremely serious offenses,” whom Congress had “specifically found” to be 
especially dangerous. 481 U.S. at 750. To impose detention, moreover, the 
Act required a court to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the 
defendant presented “an identified and articulable threat to an individual or 
the community,” and that “no conditions of release [could] reasonably assure 
the safety of the community or any person.” Id. at 750–51 (citing 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3142(f)). In short, the Act permitted detention only on the basis of 
“convincing proof that the arrestee, already indicted or held to answer for a 
serious crime, presents a demonstrable danger.” Id. Salerno did not hold that 
these precise limits were constitutionally mandated; it held, rather, that they 
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were sufficient to overcome the facial challenge. Nonetheless, the features of 
the federal regime that the Salerno Court emphasized offer a useful template.   
Limiting detention eligibility to “a specific category of extremely 
serious offenses” is a logical component of narrow tailoring for detention on 
the basis of general dangerousness. Accord ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE: PRETRIAL RELEASE § 10-5.9 (3d ed. 2007) (limiting eligibility for 
detention on this ground to defendants charged with serious or violent 
offenses); TIMOTHY R. SCHNACKE, CTR. FOR LEGAL AND EVIDENCE-BASED 
PRACTICES, MODEL BAIL LAWS: RE-DRAWING THE LINE BETWEEN PRETRIAL 
RELEASE AND DETENTION174–77 (2017) (advocating “eligibility net” 
limited to defendants charged with violent offenses and explaining statistical 
support for that limit); CAL. CONST., art. I, § 12 (permitting outright denial 
of bail only in cases of serious felony charges with clearly evident facts and 
presumptions of guilt). For those charged with minor offenses who will be 
released shortly in any case, detention provides minimal public safety value 
and might actually increase the likelihood of future crime. E.g. Heaton et al., 
supra, at 759–69; LOWENKAMP ET AL., supra.  
Careful tailoring also requires an individualized risk determination 
and proof of danger that cannot be mitigated through less restrictive means. 
For that reason, categorical barriers to pretrial release are unlikely to pass 
constitutional muster. The Ninth Circuit, for instance, has held that a 
categorical bar on pretrial release for undocumented immigrants violates 
substantive due process. Lopez-Valenzuela v. Arpaio, 770 F.3d 772, 791 (9th 
Cir. 2014). The Arizona Supreme Court has recently struck down two 
categorical release bars on the same basis. Simpson v. Miller, 387 P.3d 1270, 
1273 (Ariz. 2017), cert. denied sub nom. Arizona v. Martinez, 138 S.Ct. 146 
(2017) (categorical denial of pretrial bail for defendants accused of sexual 
conduct with a minor); State v. Wein, 417 P.3d 787, 789 (Ariz. 2018) 
(categorical denial of pretrial bail for persons charged with sexual assault). 
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Few offense categories, in isolation, are “convincing proof” of 
“demonstrable danger.” 
Nor do contemporary risk assessment tools suffice to make the 
requisite determination of necessity. The risks that such tools assess are 
typically broad: “failure to appear,” defined as any nonappearance; “new 
criminal activity,” defined as the risk of any new arrest; or even “pretrial 
failure,” defined as either a nonappearance or new arrest. E.g., Lauryn P. 
Gouldin, Disentangling Flight Risk from Dangerousness, 2016 B.Y.U. L. 
REV. 837, 867–71 (2016); Mayson, supra, at 509–10, 561–62; cf. 
Christopher Slobogin, Principles of Risk Assessment: Sentencing and 
Policing, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 583, 587 (2018); ODonnell, 251 F. Supp. 
3d at 1117–18. These broad risk categories are not particularly informative 
in the necessity inquiry. To determine if detention is necessary to ensure 
appearance, it is essential to distinguish between defendants who merely 
need help getting to court and defendants who pose a genuine risk of willful 
flight. Accord Gouldin, Defining Flight Risk, supra. No existing risk 
assessment tool does that. To determine if detention is necessary to protect 
public safety, it is essential to identify those likely to commit serious crimes. 
The likelihood of “any arrest”—including for trivial violations—is far less 
relevant to public safety, especially because people at high risk for “any 
arrest” are not necessarily at high risk for serious-crime arrest, and vice versa. 
Shima Baradaran & Frank L. McIntyre, Predicting Violence, 90 TEX. L. REV. 
497, 528–29 (2012). At the lower end of the offense spectrum, moreover, 
arrest is only a loose proxy for crime commission and arrest rates may be 
racially skewed vis-à-vis underlying rates of offending. E.g. Lauren Nichol 
Gase et al., Understanding Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Arrest: The Role 
of Individual, Home, School, and Community Characteristics, 8 RACE & 
SOC. PROBS. 296 (2016).  
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A few pretrial risk assessment tools do assess the risk of rearrest for 
violent crime specifically. See LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND., PUBLIC 
SAFETY ASSESSMENT: RISK FACTORS AND FORMULA (2016);10 Mayson, 
supra, at 512. But, thus far, they cannot predict violent-crime arrest with 
much precision.11 The first study of the PSA as implemented in Kentucky, 
for instance, found that among those defendants the tool flagged as high-risk 
for violence and released, the rate of rearrest for a violent crime in the pretrial 
period was 8.6%. See LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND., RESULTS FROM THE 
FIRST SIX MONTHS OF THE PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENT – COURT IN 
KENTUCKY 3 (2014). A more recent re-validation study documented a rate 
of 3%. MATTHEW DEMICHELE ET AL., LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND., THE 
PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENT: A RE-VALIDATION AND ASSESSMENT OF 
PREDICTIVE UTILITY AND DIFFERENTIAL PREDICTION BY RACE AND GENDER 
IN KENTUCKY (2018).12 These rates do not account for defendants who are 
detained, so may understate the statistical import of a violence flag. Yet the 
experience of Washington D.C. suggests that they probably do not understate 
it by much. The District of Columbia releases approximately 94% of 
arrestees pending trial; of those individuals, at least 86% remained arrest-free 
                                                 
10 Available at https://www.arnoldfoundation.org/wp-
content/uploads/PSA-Risk-Factors-and-Formula.pdf.  
11 The risk threshold at which defendants will be classified as “high” 
risk is a normative judgment that must be made in the development and 
implementation of each tool in each jurisdiction. It is generally made by tool 
developers, sometimes in consultation with local stakeholders. See generally 
Jessica M. Eaglin, Constructing Recidivism Risk, 67 EMORY L.J. 59 (2017). 




and 98% remained free of arrest for violent crime each year between 2011 
and 2017. E.g. PRETRIAL SERVS. AGENCY FOR D.C., CONGRESSIONAL 
BUDGET JUSTIFICATION AND PERFORMANCE BUDGET REQUEST, FY 2019, 27 
(2018); PRETRIAL SERVS. AGENCY FOR D.C., FY 2017 RELEASE RATES FOR 
PRETRIAL DEFENDANTS WITHIN WASHINGTON, D.C. (2018).13 Lastly, even 
if a pretrial risk assessment tool did measure the right risks, and even if it 
could predict with greater precision, no instrument that measures risk alone 
can address the ultimate question, which is whether some method of release 
can adequately reduce the risk. Accord Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based 
Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. 
REV. 803, 855–62 (2014).  
In sum: The due-process mandate of careful tailoring precludes 
detention absent an individualized showing that the defendant presents a 
serious risk of flight, harm to witnesses or harm to the public that cannot be 
managed in any less restrictive way. As the example of Washington D.C. 
illustrates, few defendants present such unmanageable risk. Today’s actuarial 
risk assessment tools may well have a useful role to play in pretrial decision-
making, but no classification by any current pretrial risk assessment tool is 
itself sufficient to justify a deprivation of liberty.  
 
                                                 
13 Available at https://www.psa.gov/sites/default/files/FY2019%20 
PSA%20Congressional%20Budget%20Justification.pdf; https://www.psa. 
gov/sites/default/files/2017%20Release%20Rates%20for%20DC%20Pretri
al%20Defendants.pdf. Success rates for prior years are available at PRETRIAL 
SERVS. AGENCY FOR D.C., PERFORMANCE MEASURES, https://www.psa.gov/ 





B. Procedural Due Process Prohibits the Setting of Unaffordable 
Bail in the Absence of Robust Procedures. 
 
Procedural due process requires that any deprivation of liberty be 
attended by robust procedural protections. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 332, 335; 
supra Section II.B. The Supreme Court has not specified the minimum 
procedures necessary for pretrial detention. Here again, though, Salerno 
offers a useful template. 
The Salerno Court found that the Bail Reform Act’s detention 
procedures survived a facial due process challenge. The Act permitted 
detention only after a court had found, by clear and convincing evidence in 
a full adversarial hearing, that the defendant posed “an identified and 
articulable threat” that no condition of release could manage. 481 U.S. at 751. 
The Act also provided for immediate appellate review of any detention order 
and imposed a speedy trial limit for cases in which defendants were detained. 
Id. at 752 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c)). Salerno held these procedures to 
satisfy due process, at least as a facial matter.  
The Bail Reform Act itself is also instructive, because it represents 
Congress’s understanding of the procedural protections the Due Process 
Clause requires for pretrial detention. See S. REP. No. 98–225, at 8 (1983). 
Congress recognized that the full set of detention procedures must apply 
when a court imposes unaffordable bail, as the Fifth Circuit noted in United 
States v. McConnell, 842 F.2d at 108–09; see Section II.C supra. Alarmingly, 
the Fifth Circuit panel in ODonnell, 892 F.3d at 147, dramatically 
misconstrued this aspect of McConnell, citing McConnell for the proposition 
that a court’s unilateral necessity determination is sufficient process for 
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detention on unaffordable bail.14 In fact, McConnell establishes just the 
opposite. The McConnell Court went out of its way to clarify that 
unaffordable bail triggers the Act’s full detention process, and to “remind 
[the defendant] that the detention hearing is a critical component” of that 
process. 842 F.2d at 109–10 n.5.  
The Supreme Court’s analysis in Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 
444–45 (2011), is illuminating as well. In Turner, the Supreme Court 
considered whether the Due Process Clause guarantees a defendant’s right to 
representation in a civil contempt proceeding for failure to pay court-ordered 
child support despite the inability to do so. Id. at 435. The Court recognized 
that the private interest at stake, the loss of physical liberty, “argue[d] 
strongly for the right to counsel that Turner advocates.” Id. at 445. 
Nonetheless, the Court held that due process does not entail a right to counsel 
in this context. It reasoned that the only question at issue, the defendant’s 
ability to pay, was “sufficiently straightforward” to determine without 
counsel. Id. at 446. Furthermore, a guarantee of defense counsel would 
“create an asymmetry of representation” in cases where the opposing party 
was an unrepresented parent seeking enforcement of the child-support order. 
Id. at 446–48. In such cases, the Court concluded, due process does not entail 
                                                 
14 The ODonnell panel described McConnell as “concluding that, 
under the Bail Reform Act of 1984, the ‘court must [merely] explain its 
reasons for concluding that the particular financial requirement is a necessary 
part of the conditions for release’ when setting a bond that a detainee cannot 
pay.” Id. at 160 (quoting McConnell, 842 F.3d at 110). The insertion of 
“merely” into the quoted text is unjustified and profoundly misleading, 
however, given that the McConnell court went out of its way to emphasize 
that the setting of such bail triggers the full panoply of detention procedures. 
See Section II.C supra. 
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a right to counsel so long as the state provides “alternative procedural 
safeguards”—“notice to the defendant that his ‘ability to pay’ is a critical 
issue in the contempt proceeding;” some process “to elicit relevant financial 
information” ahead of time; the opportunity for the defendant “to present, 
and to dispute, relevant information” at the hearing; and “an express finding 
by the court that the defendant has the ability to pay” before it can deprive 
the defendant of liberty. Id. at 447–48. In the absence of such safeguards, 
however, a defendant’s incarceration for failure to pay child support does 
violate the Due Process Clause. Id. at 449. 
Turner offers a helpful contrast to the pretrial criminal setting. The 
counter-party at a bail hearing that may result in detention is not an 
unrepresented parent, but the state itself. And although a defendant’s ability 
to pay is an essential consideration in bail-setting, the key question when a 
court wishes to impose unaffordable bail is whether detention is necessary 
or whether some less restrictive measure might be adequate to manage 
whatever risk the defendant presents. This question is far from 
straightforward. Given those differences, the procedural safeguards the Court 
deemed sufficient in Turner are not sufficient to “assure a fundamentally fair 
determination of the critical incarceration-related question” in the pretrial 
setting. Id. at 435. Rather, Turner suggests that due process likely requires 
representation for indigent defendants whose liberty is at stake.  
Several district courts have recently considered what procedures are 
required by the Due Process clause to minimize error in pretrial detention 
orders (including orders imposing unaffordable bail). In Caliste v. Cantrell, 
Civil No. 17-6197, 2018 WL 3727768 (E.D. La. Aug. 6, 2018), the court 
concluded, on the basis of a Mathews analysis, that due process requires “an 
inquiry into the arrestee’s ability to pay, including notice of the importance 
of this issue and the ability to be heard on this issue;” “consideration of 
alternative conditions of release, including findings on the record applying 
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the clear and convincing standard and explaining why an arrestee does not 
qualify for alternative conditions of release;” and counsel to represent the 
defendant. Id. at *12.15 In Shultz v. State, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2018 WL 
4219541, *9 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 4, 2018), the court concluded that due process 
requires notice to defendants “of their constitutional right to pretrial liberty 
[and] the evidence they must provide to prove that there are non-monetary 
conditions of pretrial release that will satisfy the purposes of bail;” an 
opportunity to be heard on that question; and a finding on the record “by clear 
and convincing evidence that pretrial detention is necessary to secure the 
defendant’s appearance at trial or to protect the public,” along with a 
statement of reasons. Id. at *19–21.  
The recent Fifth and Eleventh circuit opinions in ODonnell and 
Walker are not to the contrary, because neither opinion considered the 
procedures necessary if a fundamental right—the right to physical liberty—
is at stake. The ODonnell panel analyzed the requirements of procedural due 
process in the context of the right, guaranteed by the Texas Constitution, to 
be “bailable by sufficient sureties.” 892 F.3d at 157–59; see also id. at 163 
(finding that in the present proceedings, no “fundamental substantive due 
process right . . . is in view”). The Walker panel deemed the forty-eight hour 
                                                 
15 The court reasoned that, 
[W]ithout representative counsel the risk of erroneous pretrial 
detention is high. Preliminary hearings can be complex and 
difficult to navigate for lay individuals and many, following 
arrest, lack access to other resources that would allow them to 
present their best case. Considering the already established 
vital importance of pretrial liberty, assistance of counsel is of 




deprivation of liberty at issue in that case to be less than an “absolute” 
deprivation of physical liberty. 901 F.3d at 1264; see also id. at *12 
(declining to apply a substantive due process analysis). Neither opinion 
contradicts the proposition that, when the state seeks to deprive an individual 
of her fundamental right to physical liberty indefinitely or for the duration of 
the pretrial period, due process requires robust procedures to minimize the 
risk of error.  
Given the importance of the individual liberty interest at issue, and the 
emerging consensus of the federal courts, it is our view that, whenever a court 
seeks to impose pretrial detention (including by unaffordable bail), due 
process entitles the defendant to: 
1. A prompt hearing on the necessity of detention; 
2. Notice of the critical issue to be decided at the hearing (whether 
any less restrictive measure can meet the state’s compelling 
interests in preventing flight or serious crime); 
3. An opportunity to confront the state’s evidence and present 
relevant evidence; 
4. Representation by counsel; 
5. A judicial finding of necessity on the record, by clear and 
convincing evidence, with explanation of the facts and reasoning 
that support it; and 
6. A right to immediate appeal of the detention order. 
 
IV. THE PROPOSITION THAT PRETRIAL DETENTION MUST BE 
THOROUGHLY JUSTIFIED IS CONSISTENT WITH HISTORY AND WITH 
OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE. 
 
A. Robust Substantive and Procedural Constraints on Pretrial 




 Bail is one of the oldest legal devices still in current use. Its origins 
predate both the division between civil and criminal law and the rise of 
commercial cash economies. For this reason, it is important to be careful 
about terminology and about sweeping statements regarding the history of 
bail. “Bail” is not synonymous with “secured money bail,” the requirement 
of cash or secured collateral upfront to be released from pretrial confinement 
(often procured by paying a nonrefundable premium to a commercial surety). 
Secured money bail is relatively novel, unknown to the first hundred years 
of practice under the United States Constitution. As in property law, the 
historical meaning of “bail” in the criminal context is merely “delivery,” or 
the transfer of custody on some pledge or “surety.” See, e.g., 4 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 294–96 (1769). 
Over time and across jurisdictions, a “sufficient surety” has consisted of 
nonfinancial pledges of good behavior, unsecured pledges of property or 
money conditioned on a defendant’s appearance at trial, or collateral 
transferred upfront to “secure” that appearance. 
Reviewing the history of the Anglo-American tradition of bail 
establishes three points. First, bail has virtually always been subject to 
constitutional and legal constraints beyond the mere prohibition that the 
surety required for bail not be “excessive.” These constraints include both 
substantive rules cabining who can be deemed “ineligible” for bail and 
procedural rules regulating what has to happen before someone can be 
detained pretrial, with or without the offer of bail. Second, the “sufficiency” 
of a surety for bail originally had very little to do with a defendant’s wealth 
and nothing to do with what a defendant or his personal sureties could pay 
upfront. Procedural protections against arbitrary detention are very old; the 
relationship of secured money bail to these protections is, by comparison, a 
relatively new problem to which courts and legislatures have only recently 
given their attention. Finally, English and American jurists have long 
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recognized that constitutionally, an unaffordable or “unobtainable” bail is 
functionally equivalent to an outright denial of bail and an order of detention 
pending trial. 
Together, these historical points support the legal arguments made in 
this brief. In historical context, the Bearden line of cases rightly interprets 
equal protection and due process principles to constrain judicial discretion in 
ordering pretrial detention, including via a secured money bail requirement. 
The Salerno line of cases rightly recognizes that pretrial liberty must be 
protected, at minimum, by the substantive limits and rigorous procedures that 
Congress has imposed on pretrial detention in the federal courts. Lower 
federal courts following Salerno have, in keeping with historical 
jurisprudence, rightly recognized that an unaffordable bail is equivalent to a 
denial of bail, and therefore subject to the same constraints as an outright 
detention order.16 
 
1. History and Tradition Support Rigorous Procedures 
Protecting the Accused from Pretrial Detention with 
or without Money Bail. 
 
The modern institution of pretrial bail derives from the system of 
amercements in pre-Norman England. At a time when all crimes were 
privately prosecuted and all convictions paid in fines, a defendant could be 
                                                 
16 The history related in this brief focuses on the regulation of bail 
beyond the prohibition of excessive bail, and on the clear and consistent 
practice of treating unaffordable bail as a denial of bail altogether. For other 
legal arguments drawn from the history of bail, see State v. Brown, 338 P.3d 
1276, 1283–88 (N.M. 2014) (focusing on inequalities created by secured 
money bail systems); ODonnell, 251 F. Supp. 3d at 1068–84 (focusing on 
misdemeanor bail and alternatives to secured money bail systems).  
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released from pretrial confinement if a surety pledged to pay the total amount 
of the defendant’s potential liability. The payment became due if the 
defendant absconded before trial. June Carbone, Seeing Through the 
Emperor’s New Clothes: Rediscovery of Basic Principles in the 
Administration of Bail, 34 SYRACUSE L. REV. 517, 519–20 (1983). After the 
Normans imposed a system of public blood punishments, a bail system 
developed on the same logic of the amercements but with the difference that 
surety amounts had to be set by judicial discretion. Carbone, supra, at 519, 
521. 
As the English Parliament gained power over the centuries, its signal 
acts of constitution-making aimed to constrain executive and judicial 
discretion in the administration of pretrial imprisonment. Caleb Foote, The 
Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail I, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 959, 966 (1965) 
(“It is significant that three of the most critical steps in this process—the 
Petition of Right in 1628, the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, and the Bill of 
Rights of 1689—grew out of cases which alleged abusive denial of freedom 
on bail pending trial.”). See generally, William F. Duker, The Right to Bail: 
A Historical Inquiry, 42 ALB. L. REV. 33, 34–66 (1977); ELSA DE HAAS, 
ANTIQUITIES OF BAIL (1940); Note, Bail: An Ancient Practice Reexamined, 
70 YALE L.J. 966 (1961).  
Magna Carta provided one basis for this tradition by enshrining the 
principle that imprisonment was only to follow conviction by one’s peers. 
Magna Carta ch. 32 (1216) (“No free man shall be arrested or imprisoned . . . 
except by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land.”); accord 
Magna Carta ch. 39 (1215). From that principle jurists derived the 
presumption of innocence, the right to a speedy trial, and the right to bail—
that is, to bodily liberty pending trial on adequate assurance that one would 
reappear to stand trial. See, e.g., Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 
223 (1967); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 186 (1963); 
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Sistrunk v. Lyons, 646 F.2d 64, 68 (3d Cir. 1981) (“Bail was a central theme 
in the struggle to implement the Magna Carta’s 39th chapter which promised 
due process safeguards for all arrests and detentions.”). 
In 1554, Parliament required that the decision to admit a defendant to 
bail be made in open session, that two justices be present, and that the 
evidence weighed be recorded in writing. See TIMOTHY R. SCHNACKE ET AL., 
PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., THE HISTORY OF BAIL AND PRETRIAL RELEASE 3 
(2010). Responding to perceived abuses by the Stuart kings and their justices 
and sheriffs, who detained defendants for months without charging them—
such that they would not be admitted to bail—Parliament passed the Petition 
of Right in 1628, prohibiting imprisonment without a timely charge. See 
JOHN HOSTETTLER, SIR EDWARD COKE: A FORCE FOR FREEDOM 126 (1997). 
In the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, Parliament “established procedures to 
prevent long delays before a bail bond hearing was held,” a response to a 
recent case in which the defendant was not offered bail for over two months 
after arrest. SCHNACKE ET AL., supra, at 4. Undeterred, Stuart-era sheriffs 
and justices shifted tactics to require impossibly high surety pledges that kept 
defendants detained pretrial. Parliament responded again in 1689 with the 
English Bill of Rights and its prohibition on “excessive bail,” a phrase copied 
the next century in the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Carbone, 
supra, at 528–29. 
 In sum, by the time of the United States’ founding, pretrial release on 
bail was a fundamental part of English constitutionalism, protected in Magna 
Carta, the Petition of Right, the Habeas Corpus Act, and the English Bill of 
Rights. Together, these statutes required bail determinations to be made in 
open court sessions, with an evidentiary record, and in a timely manner so 
that accused defendants were not detained either with no charge, or on a 
charge alone without courts first carefully considering release on bail. All of 
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these constraints on pretrial detention were in addition to the famous 
prohibition that bail should not be excessive. 
 Not everyone was eligible for bail under English practice. Over the 
course of the eighteenth century, English jurists developed complex rules 
governing eligibility that differed depending on whether a local justice of the 
peace or a royal judge was making the decision. Justices of the peace, for 
instance, could not admit to bail “persons taken . . . in the fact of” stealing, 
but had discretion whether to bail “thieves openly defamed,” and had to 
admit to bail “[p]ersons charged with petit larceny” who had not “been 
previously guilty of any similar offence.” 1 JOSEPH CHITTY, A PRACTICAL 
TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW 95–97 (1816). Royal justices could “bail 
any man according to their discretion” on a writ of habeas corpus. Id. at 129. 
They tended to deny bail in serious felonies, but admitted any defendant to 
bail after “unreasonable delay” in his case, with the upper bound of one 
year’s delay on the most serious charge of treason. Id. at 129–31. 
 American practice simplified these rules and expanded the right to 
bail. Even before the English Bill of Rights, Massachusetts made all non-
capital cases bailable in 1641 (and significantly reduced the number of 
capital offenses). See Foote, supra, at 968. Pennsylvania’s 1682 constitution 
provided that “all prisoners shall be Bailable by Sufficient Sureties, unless 
for capital Offenses, where proof is evident or the presumption great.” See 
Carbone, supra, at 531 (quoting 5 AMERICAN CHARTERS 3061 (F. Thorpe 
ed. 1909)). The vast majority of American states copied Pennsylvania’s 
provision; many state constitutions still contain that language. Matthew J. 
Hegreness, America’s Fundamental and Vanishing Right to Bail, 55 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 909, 920 (2013). The Judiciary Act of 1789 likewise made all non-
capital charges bailable. 1 Stat. 91 (“And upon all arrests in criminal cases, 
bail shall be admitted, except where the punishment may be death,” in which 
cases judges had discretion to admit a defendant to bail.). 
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 California was among the states that adopted the “consensus text” 
enshrining a broad right to bail. Hegreness, supra, at 921, 9393 & nn.37, 40. 
The 1849 California constitution prohibited excessive bail in its “Declaration 
of Rights” and also provided, “All persons shall be bailable, by sufficient 
sureties: unless for capital offences, when the proof is evident or the 
presumption great.” CAL. CONST. OF 1849, art. I, §§ 6–7. A substantially 
similar provision remains in the state’s constitution today, although it 
expands the list of serious felonies for which bail may be denied. CAL. 
CONST., art. I, § 32. Before his ascension to the U.S. Supreme Court, Stephen 
J. Field as Chief Justice of California interpreted the clause to mean that 
outside of capital cases, “the admission to bail is a right which the accused 
can claim, and which no Judge or Court can properly refuse.” People v. 
Tinder, 19 Cal. 539, 542 (1862).  
 Thus, adopting the English procedural protections regulating pretrial 
detention, early American constitutions also asserted a much broader 
substantive right to pretrial liberty. While the major determination to be made 
at an English bail hearing was whether to admit to bail, Americans answered 
that question in their state constitutions and in the statute founding the federal 
judiciary. The only determination left to judicial discretion was the 
sufficiency of the sureties, that is, how to bail, not whether to bail. See 
TIMOTHY R. SCHNACKE, NAT’L INST. OF CORR., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,  
FUNDAMENTALS OF BAIL 29–36 (2014). 
 It was largely after the mid-twentieth century that some states and the 
federal government expanded judicial discretion to order “preventive 
detention.” See Note, Preventive Detention Before Trial, 79 HARV. L. REV. 
1489, 1490 (1966). The discretion to deny bail in these jurisdictions has come 
with explicit protections long identified with due process in the English 
constitutional tradition. The federal Bail Reform Act of 1984, for instance, 
permitted detention only in serious felony cases upon a judicial finding by 
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clear and convincing evidence, after a full adversary hearing, that the accused 
presented an unmanageable flight risk or risk to public safety. Pub. L. No. 
98–473, § 202, 98 Stat. 1837, 1976 (1984) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141–
50 (2012)). States that have expanded courts’ authority to order pretrial 
detention have generally also included such constraints. See, e.g., N.M. 
CONST., art. II, § 13; VT. CONST., art. II, § 40; WIS. CONST. art. I, § 8.  
 As this brief history illustrates, bail has for centuries been constrained 
by substantive and procedural requirements that go well beyond a prohibition 
on excessiveness. Indeed, the prohibition on excessive bail in the English Bill 
of Rights was a final resort to prevent officers from making an end run around 
all the other procedural protections for pretrial liberty imposed by the 
English Constitution, including timely evidentiary hearings with a right of 
appeal. See, e.g., Foote, supra, at 965–68. The United States supplemented 
these procedures by limiting discretion to deny bail to capital offenses. As 
discretion to deny bail has expanded in recent years, so too have procedural 
protections. Given the long tradition of Anglo-American regard for pretrial 
liberty, these protections are best understood as articulations of deeply rooted 
constitutional notions of due process. See generally Caleb Foote, The 
Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail II, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1125 (1965) 
(arguing that history and tradition secure a right to release on affordable bail 
on Eighth Amendment, due process, and equal protection grounds). 
  
2. The Anglo-American Bail System Has Long 
Recognized that Unaffordable Bail Constitutes an 
Order of Detention.  
 
From medieval England to modern America, magistrates have 
wielded broad discretion to determine the sufficiency of pledged sureties in 
order to permit bail. But even as the nature of those pledges have changed 
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over time, jurists have consistently concluded that an unattainable surety 
requirement is tantamount to denying bail altogether. 
Under the pre-Norman amercement system, the amount required for 
bail was coterminous with the amount of the fine for which the defendant 
would be liable upon conviction. But that amount differed based on the 
defendant’s social rank. “[T]he baron [did] not have to pay more than a 
hundred pounds, nor the routier more than five shillings.”  2 FREDERICK 
WILLIAM POLLUCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF 
ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 514 (1895).  
After the tie between the bail amount and the potential fine was 
severed, magistrates gained discretion to set the amounts that sureties would 
have to pledge based on a variety of factors, including the seriousness of the 
offense, the quality of evidence, the social status and reputation of the 
defendant, and the defendant’s ability to procure sureties. See, e.g., Bates v. 
Pilling, 149 ENG. REP. 805, 805 (K.B. 1834); Rex v. Bowes, 99 ENG. REP. 
1327, 1329 (K.B. 1787) (per curiam); Neal v. Spencer, 88 ENG. REP. 1305, 
1305–06 (K.B. 1698). Until the late nineteenth-century, virtually all bail was 
unsecured: a pledge to pay some value upon the defendant’s failure to appear, 
but with no money changing hands up front, either between the sureties and 
the state, the defendant and the state, or the defendant and his sureties. 
SCHNACKE, FUNDAMENTALS, supra, at 24–25. By law, defendants could not 
pay their sureties, even to indemnify them after forfeiture—a rule that still 
obtains in all the common law world outside the United States and the 
Philippines. F. E. DEVINE, COMMERCIAL BAIL BONDING 5–15 (1991). 
Even without upfront transfers of cash or collateral, jurists recognized 
that too high a standard for “sufficient” sureties could cause the pretrial 
detention of a defendant. In 1819, Joseph Chitty, the prolific commentator 
on English criminal practice, noted that “[t]he rule is, . . . bail only is to be 
required as the party is able to procure; for otherwise the allowance of bail 
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would be a mere colour for imprisoning the party on the charge.” 1 CHITTY, 
supra, at 131. Chitty counseled justices of the peace that in cases where they 
had to admit defendants to bail, they could not “under the pretence of 
demanding sufficient surety, make so excessive a requisition, as in effect, to 
amount to a denial of bail.” Id. at 102–03. If they did, the justices could both 
be prosecuted for a misdemeanor and also be sued civilly for false 
imprisonment. 
Nonetheless, demands for “sufficient sureties” did sometimes operate 
as de facto orders of detention, especially for itinerant populations who 
lacked local connections. Cf. THE SIXTH ANNUAL REP. OF THE PRISON 
DISCIPLINE SOCIETY 22 (1831) (reporting that, in surveyed debtors prisons, 
the “poor seamen, poor laborers, and poor mechanics” remained in jail, 
“while there is scarcely an instance on record of a poor minister, a poor 
physician, or a poor lawyer in Prison for debt”). The commercial surety 
contract arose to address this imbalance between stable defendants who had 
local ties and mobile defendants who did not. Conventional accounts date the 
first commercial surety firm to 1898 in San Francisco, the hub of western 
mobility. SCHNACKE, HISTORY, supra, at 7. By the mid-twentieth century, 
the commercial surety system had almost totally replaced the personal surety 
system in practice, to the point that “bail” has come to mean “the premium 
paid in a secured money bail system” in common parlance. See id. 
The shift in the nature of suretyship from unsecured pledges to upfront 
payments has made Chitty’s point even more salient. Since the mid-twentieth 
century, numerous jurists and jurisdictions have recognized unaffordable bail 
as a de facto order of detention. Justice William O. Douglas, sitting as a 
Circuit Judge in 1960, reasoned that “[i]t would be unconstitutional to fix 
excessive bail to assure that a defendant will not gain his freedom. Yet in the 
case of an indigent defendant, the fixing of bail in even a modest amount may 
have the practical effect of denying him release.” Bandy v. United States, 81 
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S.Ct. 197, 198 (1960) (Douglas, J., in chambers) (citing, inter alia, Stack, 
342 U.S. at 1); see also Section II.C, supra. A number of state and local 
authorities have recognized the same principle, either by forbidding 
detention based on an inability to pay money upfront, or by protecting 
indigent detainees with the same procedures required of preventive 
detention. See, e.g., Court of Appeals of Maryland, Rules Order 39 (Feb. 17, 
2017); New Orleans Mun. Code § 54–23 (2017); see also ABA STANDARDS 
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PRETRIAL RELEASE § 10-1.4(e) (3d ed. 2007) (“The 
judicial officer should not impose a financial condition of release that results 
in the pretrial detention of a defendant solely due to the defendant’s inability 
to pay.”). 
In sum, although the nature of surety relationships have changed 
dramatically over time, jurists in every era have recognized that requiring an 
unobtainable surety is tantamount to denying bail altogether, and thus 
demands the same substantive and procedural protections as an outright 
denial of bail. See also ODonnell, 251 F. Supp. 3d at 1156; Shultz v. State, --- 
F. Supp. 3d ----, 2018 WL 4219541, *9 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 4, 2018).  
 
B. Other Constitutional Provisions Do Not Obviate Equal 
Protection and Due Process Constraints.  
 
In response to equal protection and due process challenges to bail 
systems that permit unaffordable bail to be casually imposed, some have 
argued that the Fourth and Eighth Amendments provide the exclusive 
framework for claims alleging an unconstitutional deprivation of pretrial 
liberty. The basis for that argument is the interpretive canon that “where a 
particular Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional 
protection against a particular sort of government behavior, that Amendment, 
not the more generalized notion of ‘substantive due process,’ must be the 
guide for analyzing such a claim.” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 266 
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(1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 
(1989)).  
The argument is mistaken. To start, there is no necessary reason for a 
state court to adopt the canon when interpreting its own constitution. But 
even if the canon were to apply with full force to the claims at issue in this 
lawsuit, the Albright standard would not limit constitutional analysis to the 
Fourth or Eighth Amendments (or state-law equivalents), as indeed both 
Bearden and Salerno show. The reason is that neither the Fourth nor the 
Eighth Amendment provide “an explicit textual source of constitutional 
protection” against the “particular sort of government behavior” to which the 
claims in this lawsuit, and similar lawsuits, are addressed.  
The Fourth Amendment provides explicit textual protection against 
“unreasonable” searches and seizures, which the Supreme Court has 
interpreted to generally prohibit search or seizure without probable cause. 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 113–14 (1975). 
When a claimant alleges a search or seizure without probable cause, or a 
defect in the process of a search or seizure, the Fourth Amendment therefore 
provides the relevant analytical framework. Both Albright and Graham 
involved such claims. The Albright petitioner sought to challenge his 
“prosecution without probable cause” pursuant to substantive due process; 
the majority held that he must bring a Fourth Amendment claim instead. 510 
U.S. at 270-71. The petitioner in Graham alleged excessive force during an 
investigatory stop; this claim too, the Court held, was “most properly 
characterized as one invoking the protections of the Fourth Amendment.” 
490 U.S. at 388, 394. More recently, the Court has held that a petitioner could 
challenge both his arrest and later detention pursuant to the Fourth 
Amendment on the ground that the charge “was based solely on false 
evidence, rather than supported by probable cause.” Manuel v. City of Joliet, 
137 S. Ct. 911, 917 (2017). 
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Mr. Humphrey is not contesting probable cause for his seizure or the 
manner in which he was seized. He instead challenges the manner in which 
the state regulates detention and release of pretrial defendants after they have 
been seized.17 It is true that Manuel broadly asserts that “[t]he Fourth 
Amendment . . . establishes ‘the standards and procedures’ governing pretrial 
detention,” Manuel, 137 S.Ct. at 914, but the Court issued this statement to 
justify the application of Fourth Amendment to the situation at hand. It 
simply was not contemplating the question of whether a defendant might ever 
challenge his detention pursuant to a different constitutional guarantee. Id. at 
919 (holding that, “[i]f the complaint is that a form of legal process resulted 
in pretrial detention unsupported by probable cause, then the right allegedly 
infringed lies in the Fourth Amendment” (emphasis added)). Clearly the 
Fourth Amendment does not preclude the application of other constitutional 
guarantees to the state’s pretrial decision-making. If it did, the state could, 
with impunity, condition pretrial liberty on religion, race, or defendants’ 
political views. Nor is it plausible to suggest that probable cause is all that is 
necessary to justify pretrial detention. The requirement of probable cause is 
a floor, not a ceiling. E.g. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 126 (holding that a “timely 
judicial determination of probable cause” is a “prerequisite to detention,” not 
that it is sufficient justification) (emphasis added); id. at 125 n.27 
(recognizing that “the probable cause determination is in fact only the first 
stage of an elaborate system, unique in jurisprudence, designed to safeguard 
the rights of those accused of criminal conduct”).  
 Nor does the Eighth Amendment provide explicit textual protection 
against casual or systemic detention on unaffordable bail. The Excessive Bail 
                                                 
17 Or, if one takes Justice Ginsburg’s view that a defendant remains 
“seized” even if released so long as prosecution is pending, during the period 
of the seizure. Albright, 510 U.S. at 276–81 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
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Clause, as presently construed by the Court, does not itself prohibit detention. 
Salerno, 481 U.S. at 754–55. Nor has it been uniformly construed to prohibit 
bail beyond a defendant’s ability to pay. See supra note 2. The Clause 
protects against bail set in an individual case that is greater than necessary to 
serve the state’s interests. Excessive bail claims may therefore be brought by 
released defendants who wish to challenge the amount of collateral required 
to secure their release. Cf. Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 481–82 (1982) 
(excessive bail claim becomes moot only on conviction). A detained 
defendant may have an excessive bail claim as well as equal protection and 
due process claims, but the latter are not logically enfolded in the former.  
Instead, applying Albright’s principles, it is the Equal Protection 
Clause and the Due Process Clause that protect the “specific constitutional 
right[s] allegedly infringed” here. Graham, 490 U.S. at 393–94. The claim 
that the state has imposed detention without adequate justification or 
procedures sounds in due process, because “[f]reedom from imprisonment—
from government custody, detention, and other forms of physical restraint—
lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.” 
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). Moreover, the Due Process 
Clause protects “those fundamental rights and liberties which are, 
objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.” Washington 
v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted). The right to pretrial release and the constraints on pretrial 
detention are deeply rooted in Anglo-American legal history and tradition, 
and those rights go well beyond the proscription of excessive bail. The claim 
that the state imposes detention in a manner that impermissibly discriminates 
against some group sounds in equal protection because, under the Equal 
Protection Clause, “[r]ules under which personal liberty is to be deprived are 
limited by the constitutional guarantees of all, be they moneyed or indigent, 
befriended or friendless, employed or unemployed, resident or transient, of 
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good reputation or bad.” Rainwater, 572 F.2d at 1057. As the Bearden Court 
reasoned, financial assessments that serve to detain the indigent are best 
evaluated at the point where “[d]ue process and equal protection principles 
converge.” 461 U.S. at 665. 
Indeed, Bearden and Salerno themselves are the best indications that 
pretrial detention and bail are not analyzed solely under the Fourth and 
Eighth Amendments.18 Bearden subjected the conversion of monetary fines 
into incarceration to heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection and Due 
Process Clauses apart from Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on excessive 
fines. Salerno evaluated the federal bail system under both procedural and 
substantive due process apart from either the Eighth Amendment’s 
prohibition of excessive bail or the Fourth Amendment’s regulations of 
pretrial procedure. Lower federal courts have recently recognized the same 
principle. Walker, 901 F.3d 1245, 1260 (11th Cir. 2018) (rejecting 
defendants’ argument that the Eighth Amendment provides the exclusive 
vehicle by which to challenge bail practices); ODonnell v. Harris Cty., 892 
F.3d 147, 157 (5th Cir. 2018) (same); see also United States v. Giangrosso, 
763 F.2d 849, 851 (7th Cir. 1985) (“[The defendant] is not complaining about 
excessive bail, but about the procedures used to deny bail; that is a complaint 
                                                 
18 The United States Congress also recognized substantive and 
procedural constraints beyond the Eighth Amendment’s excessiveness 
prohibition in enacting the Bail Reform Act of 1984. The Senate Committee 
wrote: “[T]he Committee recognizes a pretrial detention statute may 
nonetheless be constitutionally defective if it fails to provide adequate 
procedural safeguards or if it does not limit pretrial detention to cases in 
which it is necessary to serve the societal interests it is designed to protect. 
The pretrial detention provisions of this section have been carefully drafted 
with these concerns in mind.” S. REP. No. 98-225, at 8 (1983). 
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under the due process clause . . . .”). As these cases show, within the domain 
of pretrial detention substantive due process is not “uncharted,” nor its 
guideposts “scarce and open-ended.” Albright, 510 U.S. at 272 (quoting 
Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)).  
Rather, Bearden and Salerno require that pretrial detention meet 
heightened scrutiny. Salerno and the broad consensus of state 
constitutionalism counsel that detention, either ordered outright or de facto, 
must be limited to cases of serious, immitigable threats to the state’s interests. 
Salerno, Mathews, and Turner suggest that, at a minimum, due process 
requires timely adversarial hearings, with findings by clear and convincing 
evidence on the record, and with a right of immediate appeal to protect the 
fundamental right of physical liberty pending trial.   
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